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Canadian-born academic Margaret Doody has written several detective novels in 
which the philosopher Aristotle makes use of his investigative powers to solve murder 
mysteries. In Aristotle and poetic justice, Stephanos, a friend of Aristotle, narrates how 
Aristotle solved a double murder which had taken place on the road to Delphi. Doody’s 
novel provides a convenient framework for a view on the Greek world of 330 BC and, 
incidentally, a new look at Aristotle’s perception of Greek genres. This article focuses 
on both these topics, the latter through the lens of Aristotle’s Poetics. In the body of 
the article, allusions to the Poetics introduced by Doody are examined and evaluated, 
using a modified version of Genette’s scheme as criterion.
Aristoteles se Poëtika in Margaret Doody se Aristotle and 
poetic justice
Margaret Doody, ’n Kanadees-gebore akademikus, het reeds vyf speurromans geskryf 
waarin die filosoof Aristoteles van sy speurvernuf gebruik maak om moordraaisels 
op te los. In Aristotle and poetic justice vertel Stephanos, ’n vriend van Aristoteles, hoe 
Aristoteles ’n dubbele moord opgelos het wat op pad na Delphi gepleeg is. Doody 
se roman bied ’n gerieflike raamwerk vir ’n blik op die Griekse wêreld van 330 vC 
en boonop op Aristoteles se siening van Griekse genres. Die artikel fokus op beide 
hierdie onderwerpe, laasgenoemde deur die lens van Aristoteles se Poëtika. In die 
kern van die artikel word verwysings in Doody se roman na die Poëtika ondersoek en 
geëvalueer aan die hand van ’n aangepaste weergawe van Genette se skema.
Mr F R Pauw, Dept of Ancient Studies, Stellenbosch University, Private Bag X1, 








This article aims to examine the function of allusions to Ar-istotle’s Poetics in Margaret Doody’s novel Aristotle and poetic justice. The novel is approached as a work of fiction, reflecting 
a literary and historical hypotext, rather than as a detective mystery. 
First, the author and her genre are introduced, narrative strategies 
are examined, the personae of the novel introduced, and a plot sum-
mary provided. After a theoretical section on hypertext, its applica-
tion is tested on two levels. First, Doody’s use of faction are examined 
in which historical and fictional characters and events are conflated. 
The bulk of the article is devoted to an exploration of the Poetics as 
a tool whereby Aristotle attempts to apply the paradigm of literary 
genres to the experiences of the characters. The penultimate sec-
tion evaluates the ways in which Doody employs her Aristotelian 
hypotext, using a modified version of Genette’s scheme as criterion. 
In conclusion, it is argued that novels such as Doody’s contribute to 
popularising the classics.
1. The author and her genre
Margaret Doody, professor in English Literature at Notre Dame Uni-
versity, specialises in restoration and eighteenth-century British lite-
rature and the novel, on which she has published extensively.1 She has 
also managed to write five novels featuring Aristotle as detective.
Historical novels about Graeco-Roman antiquity have proliferated 
to such an extent that they have almost come to represent a dis crete 
genre which esteemed authors such as Rosemary Sutcliff, Mary Re-
nault and Colleen McCullough have made their own. In fact, “ancient 
detective fiction” can already be identified as a separate subgenre, with 
Lindsey Davis’ M. Didius Falco (Mench 1993: 54) and Steven Saylor’s 
Gordianus the finder (Mench 1993: 49) taking pride of place as Roman 
private investigators. Compared to Roman detective fiction, however, 
ancient Greek detective fiction appears to be very limited.
1 Cf <http://www nd.ed/~mdoody/>
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2. Narrative strategies, personae and plot
The Athenian Stephanos, a former student of the Macedonian phi-
losopher Aristotle at the Lyceum in Athens, is used throughout as 
first-person narrator. One of his functions is to act as sounding board 
for the amateur detective Aristotle to test his hypotheses as he makes 
progress with his investigation. In fact, Stephanos plays Watson to 
Aristotle’s Holmes, thus unwittingly acting as intermediary for Ar-
istotle’s thought processes and obviating the need for too many ex 
cathedra pronouncements by the Stageiran. As the most empirically 
minded of all Greek philosophers, Aristotle is ideally cast in his role 
as amateur detective. His knowledge of human psychology and logic 
stands him in good stead in the novel. As is implicit in the title, his 
poetics also come into play.
The length of the novel – 399 pages – can partly be accounted for 
by Doody’s fondness for complicating the plot, but also by digres-
sions on a Herodotean scale. Dorothy Sayers has written a tongue-in-
cheek article in which she applies the “rules” of the Poetics to detec-
tive fiction. Doody would do well to heed her advice:
A man might write a detective story of the length of [Joyce’s] Ulysses, 
but, if he did, the reader would not be able to bear all the scattered 
clues in mind from the first chapter to the last, and the effect of the 
final discovery would be lost (Sayers 1988: 27-8).
Apart from Aristotle and Stephanos, the most important mem-
bers of the large cast of characters are centred around an Athenian 
family of “Silver Men”. The Athenians Lysippos and Timotheos are 
brothers, the former a rich silver merchant, the latter an unworldly 
Platonist. Their brother Pherekrates has recently died. As daughter 
of Pherekrates, Anthia (nearly sixteen) has now become an heiress 
and is temporarily under the care of Lysippos. The beautiful Kallir-
rhoe of Ephesos is Anthia’s slave. Lysippos has three children: Stra-
ton, Gorgias and Myrrhine. Gorgias has been missing in action after 
the Battle of Issos. Other characters include Glaukon, a silversmith 
and a shrewd dealer, and Ammonios, a brothel-owner with a newly 
developed interest in silver.
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When Aristotle is requested by Lysippos to investigate the pre-
sumed abduction of Anthia and Kallirrhoe (Doody 2002: 53-5),2 he 
and Stephanos depart on horseback for Delphi (72). Beneath a sacred 
oak in the hills of Boiotia, they discover the body of Straton; Aristotle 
deduces that he was stabbed on three separate occasions by three sepa-
rate assailants (106). At the crossroads made famous by Oedipus, they 
next discover the body of Ammonios, who has been stabbed with a 
boar-spear (137-8). After being joined en route by Korydon, the lover 
of Kallirrhoe, they recover Kallirrhoe (238-41), and later Gorgias and 
Anthia (287-304), unharmed in the vicinity of Delphi. Before falling 
to his death above Delphi (331), Timotheos admits to the murder of 
Straton and Ammonios (329).
Near the end of the novel, Aristotle, ready for his dénouement, as-
sembles all concerned and goes through the case point by point: the 
abductor was Glaukon (347-8); his prize was marriage to Anthia and 
thus a claim to her inheritance (353). In this instance, he was sup-
ported by Lysippos and, in particular, by Straton (352, 357). Since 
Ammonios wanted to gain a silver contract (360), and since he was 
interested in Anthia (362), he was poisoned by Straton (362). An in-
disposed Ammonios therefore set off to Delphi (361); at the oak tree, 
he stabbed Straton, already wounded by Gorgias, and left him dying 
(363). Ammonios, however, had to bustle off when he was interrupted 
by Timotheos, who finished off Straton (365), his object being to get 
total control of the family wealth (368). From what Timotheos learned 
from Straton before his death, he realised that Ammonios knew too 
much (366). He therefore killed him with a boar-spear at the crossroads 
(367). Timotheos also wanted to kill Lysippos (369) and attempted to 
frighten Myrrhine into committing suicide (370), in which case Tim-
otheos would inherit all the family money; if not, Timotheos could lay 
hands on the money by marrying her (371).
2 All quotations from and page references to Aristotle and poetic justice are based 
on the 2002 Random House edition. Only the page numbers in parentheses 
are provided below.
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3. Hypertext: theory
Since Doody’s allusions to the Poetics will be discussed in literary-
theoretical terms, the meanings of terms such as “intertext”, “hypo-
text” and the like should first be briefly examined.3
In the introductory chapter to his magistral work on hypertextu-
ality, Gérard Genette distinguishes five types of “hypertextualité”,4 
of which the following two are pertinent in this instance: “intertex-
tualité” (Julia Kristeva’s term), where text A is present in text B in 
the form of quotations or allusions (Genette 1982: 8-9), and “hyper-
textualité”,5 where text B (the “hypertexte”) is derived from text 
A (the “hypotexte”) without B being a commentary on A (Genette 
1982: 11-4). 
Genette (1982: 451-2) compares the process whereby text A is 
transformed into text B to the creation of a palimpsest. A real-life 
palimpsest is the result of one or more texts written over the original 
on a vellum or papyrus manuscript. When applied to comparative lit-
erature, the metaphor of a palimpsest is similarly used to describe the 
result of Text B being “superscripted” or “superimposed” on Text A.6 
An obvious example of such a “hypotexte” cited by Genette (1982: 
355-7) is the Odyssey, with Vergil’s Aeneid and James Joyce’s Ulysses 
as two of its many “hypertextes”.7
Linda Hutcheon’s theory of adaptation in literature, cinematogra-
phy and other media also makes use of the metaphor of a palimpsest:
Part of this ongoing dialogue with the past, for this is what ad-
aptation means for audiences [or readers, FP], creates the doubled 
pleasure of the palimpsest – and knowingly so. […] This is the 
3 This section is an abbreviated and modified version of “hypo- and hypertexts” 
in Pauw 2008.
4 In this instance, hypertextualité, consisting of five subcategories, is used as “um-
brella term” for an all-encompassing textualité.
5 In this instance, the term hypertextualité is more specific: it is one of the five 
subcategories.
6 Michael Alexander (Hutcheon 2006: 6) punningly speaks of the “palimpses-
tuous” relation between works: “If we know that prior text, we always feel its 
presence overshadowing the one we are experiencing directly.”
7 Genette’s terms will be anglicised in the remainder of this article.
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intertextual pleasure in adaptation that some call elitist and others 
call enriching. Like classical imitation, adaptation appeals to the 
‘intellectual and aesthetic pleasure’ […] of understanding the in-
terplay between works, of opening up a text’s possible meanings to 
intertextual echoing. The adaptation and the adapted work merge 
in the audience’s understanding of their complex interrelations 
[…] (Hutcheon 2006: 116-7).
Unlike Genette’s examples of hypertextuality, some recent novels 
provide material for hypertextual study across generic parameters. It 
has been argued that this applies to Donna Tartt’s The secret history 
(Pauw 1994 & 1995) and to William Golding’s The double tongue (Pauw 
2008), where Greek tragedies (Euripides’ Bacchae and Ion, respective-
ly) are used as acknowledged hypotexts. There thus appears to be a 
second way of adapting a classical hypotext: using a classical original 
in a certain genre as model for a hypertext in a different genre. A third 
approach could be added: using an historical or biographical novel to 
portray a particular period or historical personage, thus infusing the 
“facts” of history with the subjective element of fictionalisation.
For the sake of brevity, (i) will be called intrageneric (Homer 
       Vergil); (ii) transgeneric (Genette 1982: 15) (Euripides        Tartt); 
and (iii) faction, a conflation of historical fact and fictional elements 
(Van Heerden 1994: 5). These three theoretical options frequently 
overlap to some extent. To complicate matters, there is sometimes 
overlapping between the terms intertext and hypotext, depending on 
the extent of intertextual borrowing. In view of the frequency and im-
portance of references to the Poetics, this will be regarded as more than a 
minor, incidental intertext. For the purposes of this examination, this 
will be treated as a solid hypotext. 
4. Faction
The characters in Doody’s novel frequently refer to historical events 
in the Greek world. This is no mere empty parading of historical 
knowledge on the part of the author, a well-versed classicist, but 
provides an historical intertext commensurate with the late classical 
era. Not surprisingly, in the fictional world of 330 BC such refer-
ences usually have a bearing either on the conquests of Alexander 
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the Great or on the biographical background of Aristotle or his near-
contemporaries such as Theophrastos.
An historical novel is a work of fiction. It is not to be judged by 
the same criteria as historiography for, in Aristotelian terms, it is 
“poetry” rather than “history”;8 in modern literary parlance, it is not 
fact but faction. Linda Hutcheon (1988: 5) coined the term “histo-
riographic metafiction” to refer to works that fictionalise actual his-
torical events or figures. In Hutcheon’s postmodernist field of refer-
ence, this term implies that the authorial personae allow themselves 
much more narratological liberties than Doody does, as witness her 
examples (Midnight’s children, The tin drum, Flaubert’s parrot, among 
others). Nevertheless, Doody’s novel qualifies as faction because, on 
the one hand, all the characters – even Aristotle, who has an histori-
cal equivalent – and the plot are fictional and, on the other, the set-
ting could demonstrably be correlated with the historical Athens 
and Delphi of 330 BC. Thus, the overarching effect is that of a confla-
tion of fact and fiction.
Against this background, should a distinction be made between 
the “fictional” Aristotle and the “historical” Aristotle? Brian McHale 
(1987), for one, disagrees with this principle. Applying Eco’s term 
“transworld identity”, he argues that
[i]f an entity in one world differs from its ‘prototype’ in another 
world only in accidental properties, not in essentials, and if there is 
a one-to-one correspondence between the prototype and its other-
world variant, then the two entities can be considered identical 
even though they exist in different worlds.
The reader then intuits that “[…] a historical personage is in some 
sense the ‘same’ as his fictional representation in an historical novel” 
(McHale 1987: 35). Nevertheless, to avoid confusion a distinction shall 
be made, where necessary, between “the fictional Aristotle” (Doody’s 
character) and “the historical Aristotle” (the author of the Poetics).
How trustworthy is Doody’s fictional depiction of historical events, 
as reflected in narrations or conversations between characters? It appears 
that the author knows her history. She has been most meticulous in her 
8 Poetics 9. 1451a-b.
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research – except for the minor peccadillo that Aristotle could not yet 
have been 56 in the spring of 330, as the List of characters claims.
The single most important chronological reference for the pur-
pose of dating the fictional time of the novel is made very early, when 
Stephanos places the Anthesteria with which the novel commences in 
the year “when Aristophanes […] was arkhon – the spring when Alex-
ander was making himself master of Persia, just after he had captured 
Persepolis […]” (2-3, cf 15). Since Persepolis was taken in January 330 
BC (Fox 1973: 256-7), this gives the novel a fictional date of spring 
330 BC. This dating is reinforced by numerous references to the con-
quests of Alexander in the first half of the novel. Thus, for instance, 
first Stephanos (8) and then Lysippos (19) refer to Alexander’s taking of 
Egypt as an advantage for securing much-needed grain supplies. This 
event can be dated to 331 BC (Kinder & Hilgemann 1982: 65). On 
another occasion, Ammonios tells Stephanos about the death in battle 
of Pherekrates’ son Demodikos “seven years ago, at Khaironia, when 
Athens and Thebes fought together […]” (13). This leads to Stephanos 
reminiscing that “I had been nearly old enough to fight myself in that 
war against King Philip of Macedon and his victorious son Alexander, 
who had led the Macedonian cavalry himself in that very battle” (14). 
The attempted Athenian-Theban resistance to the Macedonian inva-
sion at Khaironia can be dated to 338 BC, so that Doody’s time frame 
squares with that of the historians. The resultant fate of Thebes is later 
recalled by Stephanos when they are travelling through rural Boiotia: 
“These rustics in their village had at least escaped the cruel destruction 
loosed by the Makedonian kings on that unfortunate city, formerly the 
capital of Boiotia” (128). Robert Lane Fox (1973: 88) describes the fate 
of Thebes in 335 BC as follows:
[The allied Greeks with resentments against Thebes] voted for 
Thebes’s utter destruction […]. So the city was destroyed, all pri-
vate ground was given to the allies to farm as a reward, and 30,00 
Thebans are said to have been enslaved, women and children in-
cluded.” Ammonios further enlightens Stephanos that “Gorgias 
[…] went off to war a few years ago. […] Declared missing in ac-
tion in one of the skirmishes after the battle of Issos town” (14).
The battle of Issos can be dated to November 333 BC (Kinder & 
Hilgemann 1982: 65). 
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When Korydon joins Aristotle and Stephanos, he naturally has 
occasion to refer to political events influencing his adventures in 
Ionia. He rhetorically asks, for instance: “You know the history of 
Ephesos – how the cities of the coast and ours among them were be-
sieged by Alexander four years ago?” (164). Later, he recounts how 
“Alexander […] gave [Halikarnassos] to Queen Ada. […] So she 
ruled as vice-regent of Alexander […] and all of Karia was put under 
her control” (175). Fox (1973: 136) mentions that she adopted Alex-
ander as her son; thereupon, “mother Ada was named [Caria’s] satrap 
and given troops under a Macedonian commander to do work that 
might prove too strenuous for an elderly woman” (Fox 1973: 139-
40). References such as the above authenticate Korydon’s account of 
his peregrinations in Ionia and add local colour to his narrative.
Some historical references relate to the historiographic activities 
of Aristotle. Both Aristotle (63) and Stephanos (199) recount how 
Aristotle and his nephew Kallisthenes had been involved “just after 
the Sacred War” (63), or “seven or eight years ago” (199) in writing 
the history of Delphi and compiling the List of victors at the Pythian 
Games at Delphi. According to De Ste Croix (1992: 29), the latter en-
terprise is proved beyond doubt by a Delphic inscription. Aristotle 
further informs Stephanos that “Kallisthenes my nephew has been 
writing his history as he accompanies Alexander …” (169, 63).9
All these chronological allusions are revealed naturally in the 
course of Stephanos’ narration or in conversations between charac-
ters, so that they do not create the impression of an artificial history 
lesson. Thus, the fictional characters and the factual background are 
successfully integrated into faction.
From the above examples, it appears that Doody is meticulous in 
framing her fictional plot and characters against a military-political 
background that can be checked for factual correctness. Although 
her references to socio-cultural practices such as inheritance laws, re-
ligious customs, dress codes or the architecture of Athens and Delphi 
9 Allusions to historical events in the more remote past occur on pages 10 
(Themistocles), 205 (the naval battle at Aigospotamoi in 405), 191 (the earth-
quake at Delphi in 373), and 205 (the battle of Leuktra in 371).
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have not been closely examined, the author believes that she demon-
strates the same attention to detail when dealing with them.
5. Aristotle’s Poetics
Such is the importance of literature in Greek culture that no novel 
with a classical Greek setting, especially one in which Aristotle fea-
tures, would carry conviction if it fails to contain ample references 
to Greek literature. In this, Doody does not disappoint the reader, 
for there is sufficient allusion to archaic and classical literature to 
ring true. Some allusions are explicitly identified per author or title; 
other literary hypotexts are implicitly alluded to. Authors who are 
mentioned or implied include, in chronological sequence, Homer, 
Hesiod, Aeschylos, Sophocles, Euripides, Herodotos, Aristophanes, 
Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastos, Menander, Theokritos and Chariton. 
This article will focus exclusively on Aristotle’s Poetics.
It is to be expected that a philosopher such as Aristotle would, 
on occasion, intersperse small talk or discussions of the murder cases 
with discourses on his own philosophy. In contrast to Plato, Aris-
totle is known as an empirical researcher with a proclivity for the 
natural sciences that was not shared by his idealist precursor and 
mentor. What does come as a surprise, therefore, is the frequency and 
profundity with which remarks are made that the reader can trace 
to a single work of Aristotle that, in dealing with literary theory, 
is perhaps least representative of his oeuvre. Sizeable chunks of the 
fictional Aristotle’s musings are taken over almost verbatim, or in a 
thematically recognisable form, from the Poetics.10 It should be noted 
that the historical Aristotle’s interest in tragedy was not merely an 
ephemeral phenomenon limited to a monograph written in approxi-
mately 335 BC. Victor Castellani (1990: 32) has calculated that as 
early as in the second and third books of the Rhetoric, Aristotle cites 
and quotes Attic playwrights even more often than Attic and other 
orators in nearly every chapter. This demonstrates not only the moral 
10 Reference to other works of Aristotle, or allusion to his views, is made on pp 
65 (the non-extant For Eudemos on the Soul), 184-5, 263 and 398 (Politics: on 
slavery, and on the collective inclination of social beings).
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importance he attached to drama as educating the individual and 
the polis, but also his own acquaintance with and interest in Greek 
drama, in particular tragedy, even before he had started to write the 
Poetics. 
In Doody’s novel, the fictional Aristotle discusses, without at-
tribution, aspects of the Poetics in 330 BC which his historical coun-
terpart had put to paper some five years previously. Against this 
background, the hypertextual adaptations of the Poetics in Aristotle 
and poetic justice will be considered.
5.1 The manner of imitation
The narration in Aristotle and poetic justice commences with a descrip-
tion of the Anthesteria festival (1-2), and the first fifty pages are inter-
spersed with references to this festival. The last day of the Anthesteria, 
the Day of the Pots, is a day of ill omen, on which it is customary to 
make an offering to Hermes of the Underworld (48). The slaves, the 
children and the women are therefore sitting in the kitchen regaling 
each other with fearful stories of spirits from the Underworld (49), 
probably for apotropaic reasons. When Stephanos’ steward, Dame-
tas, mimics different voices in telling his tales, Aristotle remarks:
Interesting […] how all men naturally delight in imitation. There 
you see the native origin of all poetry, even the epics of Homer 
and the dramas of Sophokles. Dametas […] creates character, and 
speaks in various voices. In its perfection, that is the technique of 
Homer, who wastes little time speaking for himself, but is always 
bringing forth characters who say and do things (49-50).
The fictional Aristotle’s remark is a conflation of three separate 
passages in the Poetics. In the first,11 the historical Aristotle argues 
that the origin of poetry is to be found in two natural causes (fusikaiv 
aijtivai): that man is the most imitative (mimhtikwvtatovn) of all liv-
ing beings, and that he finds pleasure (to; caivrein) in imitation. 
Poetry derives especially from the second of these. The second pas-
sage12 deals with the so-called “manner (or mode) of imitation”. 
11 Poetics 4. 1448b4-9.
12 Poetics 3. 1448a19-24.
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Since Aristotle’s argument suffers from the terseness customary to 
the Poetics and has been subjected to emendation, I take recourse to 
the paraphrase of Golden & Hardison (1986: 85-6), according to 
whom Aristotle provides for three different manners of representa-
tion: when the poet speaks in his own person (as in dithyramb, or 
in modern lyric poetry); when the characters in drama do their own 
“imitating” or impersonating,13 and the mixed kind, which is a com-
bination of the previous two and epitomised by Homer.14
In the third passage,15 which specifically deals with epic poetry, 
Homer’s narratological approach is praised because he limits his own 
“voice”. A remark by Deborah Roberts (1992: 143) contextualises 
this passage:
What is implicit here is that the more closely [epic] narrative 
approximates to drama (a desideratum suggested by Aristotle’s 
praise of Homer in Chapter 24 for being more mimetic in the dra-
matic sense than other epic poets), that is, the more vivid and more 
detailed its narration, the more it will evoke the same response as 
drama […].
In fact, the phraseology of the fictional Aristotle (“Homer […] 
wastes little time speaking for himself”) as well as that of the histori-
cal Aristotle (“the poet himself should speak in his own person […] 
as little as possible”) does less than justice to Homer’s contribution. 
Irene de Jong (1987: x, 7) has calculated that only 45% of the Iliad 
consists of speeches and 55% of simple or complex narration. If one 
follows De Jong, the latter is to be credited to the voice of the poet. 
In that case, the claim of the author, or of the fictional Aristotle as her 
mouthpiece, is exaggerated.
13 This is reiterated in 6. 1449b-26-27, where it is said that the mimésis is to be 
accomplished by means of acting and not by means of narration (drwvntwn kai; 
ou; di∆ a;paggeliva~).
14 For a summary of alternative interpretations, cf Woodruff 1992: 78-9.
15 Poetics 24. 1460a7-11.
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5.2 The fearful: probability and necessity
When Aristotle resumes, he introduces a new topic, his subject mat-
ter, however, still being provided by Dametas’ ghost stories:
Yet the marvellous is required in tragedy. And in epic. All nar-
ratives should cause wonder in some fashion. But this kind of 
fireside tale, the sort which endeavours to rouse horror without 
moral meaning, is admittedly not a high form. […] The hearers 
recognize their own wonder is cheaply bought. Actions should be 
connected by cause and effect. A good story should not be made 
up of random or improbable incidents. There are improbabilities 
in Odysseus’ being set ashore in Ithaka which would be unbear-
ably absurd in the hands of a worse poet than Homer. If our belief 
is suddenly strained, we lose that faith in the work as a whole 
which is, while not the true pleasure of literature, the basis of all 
its pleasures (50).
Once again, the fictional Aristotle’s discourse is a conflation of a 
number of passages in the Poetics. The function of “the marvellous” 
(to; qaumastovn) is discussed in a passage16 where it is commended, 
as being “pleasing” (hJduv), for tragedy and even more so for epic po-
etry. The censure of “horror without moral meaning” is reminiscent 
of a passage17 where Aristotle slates the use of “the monstrous” for 
shock effect: “Those who use the spectacle to create not the fearful 
(to; fobero;n) but only the monstrous (to; teratw`de~) have no share 
in the creation of tragedy.”18 “The fearful”, of course, plays an indis-
pensable role in Aristotle’s definition of tragedy, where he famously 
but ambiguously states that “tragedy achieves, through the repre-
sentation of pitiable and fearful incidents (di’ ejlevou kai; fovbou), the 
catharsis of such pitiable and fearful incidents”.19
Plato believed that dramatic poetry, on account of its mimetic 
(and thus misleading) quality, has the psychological power to harm 
the souls of his Guardians.20 Aristotle’s response is to address the 
16 Poetics 24. 1460a11-18.
17 Poetics 14. 1453b8-10.
18 Translations of the Poetics are those of Leon Golden, occasionally slightly altered.
19 Poetics 6. 1449b27-28. In the context of Aristotle’s definition, fovbo~ and 




affective dimension of tragedy that had been attacked by Plato. He 
does so by arguing that the emotions of pity and fear are neutralised 
by catharsis and so rendered beneficial instead of harmful. Rorty 
(1992: 14) gives a comprehensive definition of catharsis:
[I]t is a medical term, referring to a therapeutic cleansing or pur-
gation; it is a religious term, referring to a purification achieved 
by the formal and ritualized, bounded expression of powerful and 
often dangerous emotions; it is a cognitive term, referring to an 
intellectual resolution or clarification that involves directing emo-
tions to their appropriate intentional objects.
Rorty (1992: 14) and Segal (1996: 155) argue that the three notions 
should not be separated but regarded as complementary.
In creating optimal conditions for experiencing painful emotions 
and for enjoying their subsequent relief, Aristotle thus counters Pla-
to’s criticism of dramatic poetry.
A further Aristotelian hypotext implicit in this passage21 deals 
with the importance of probability (to; eijko;~) or necessity (to; 
ajnagkai`on) in the plot of a tragedy. Since the poet writes fiction, 
he can improvise his plot, even if it is based on a well-known myth. 
When, however, he improvises his plot in a random or improbable 
manner, when it consists of a series of episodic and causally unrelated 
events, it will be considered inferior. To be effective, it should have 
an internally consistent logic, A. leading to B. and B. leading to C. 
according to the laws of probability or necessity.22
By implication, such causal coherence should also hold true for 
the murder mystery plot which Aristotle has unravelled: the seem-
ingly unrelated should be shown to be causally related “according to 
the laws of probability or necessity”. Thus, for instance, his deduction 
21 Poetics 9. 1451a38.
22 The role of probability is qualified by a passage near the end of the novel. 
When Aristotle and Stephanos cannot satisfactorily fit their experiences into 
any known genre, Aristotle adds: “As for improbabilities, an author can use 
them skilfully; I admit they exist in the world. As Agathon said, ‘It is likely 
that unlikely things should happen.’ One would rather have a probable impos-
sibility than an improbable possibility” (393). The hypotext for this allusion is 
Poetics 18. 1455a23-25; also cf 24. 1460 a26-27; 25, 1461b11-12.
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that by a combination of motive, opportunity and temperament, it 
was Timotheos who murdered Straton and dealt the final blow to 
Ammonios, was based on probability and logical “necessity”.
The fictional Aristotle’s example of Homer handling the improb-
ability of Odysseus being set ashore in Ithaca more skilfully than 
poorer poets would have done is mentioned in a chapter in the Poetics 
dealing with epic poetry.23
A last Aristotelian hypotext24 is contained in the words “the true 
pleasure of literature”. According to Rorty (1992: 16):
The pleasures that are specific to tragic drama are those that con-
nect the most profound of our pleasures – the pleasures of learning 
– with the therapeutic pleasures of catharsis, ‘the pleasure arising 
from pity and fear through mimesis’.
The above clearly indicates that the fictional Aristotle used a mun-
dane experience (the telling of ghost stories by Dametas) to theorise, 
much like his historical counterpart but in a more casual manner, 
about what may be allowed in tragedy and epic. Since the tone is 
conversational, he does not attempt to recap or draw a consistent 
conclusion; in fact, he soon starts with a new topic.
5.3 The primacy of plot
After an interruption by Stephanos, Aristotle proceeds:
[P]hilosophers only discourse, and do not represent life. In their 
lectures and in their pages, nothing happens. […] But in life men 
live by action – by doing – not for some static quality. It is finally 
in our deeds and our experience that we are happy or miserable. 
The spine of life is truly action of some kind or other. […] You can 
have a tragedy without much in the way of character, but tragedy 
is impossible without action (51).
Aristotle then adds that he has tried his hand at tragedy, but that “[t]
he characters, who all sounded the same, stood about philosophizing 
most tranquilly”, and that he therefore discontinued his attempts (52).
23 Poetics 24. 1460a34-37.
24 Poetics 14. 1453b10-14.
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This discourse by the fictional Aristotle echoes a hypotext in the 
Poetics25 where the historical Aristotle, having distinguished be-
tween the six components of tragedy, now grades plot and character 
in terms of importance. To the argument adduced in the quotation 
(“Tragedy is possible without character – a[neu hjqw`n – but not with-
out action – a[neu pravxew~”), three others are added: the purpose 
of tragedy is achieved by plot and incidents (action), rather than 
by speeches demonstrating character; reversal and recognition, by 
means of which tragedy “exerts an influence on the soul”, are parts of 
the plot, and the construction of plots is more difficult than the per-
fection of character (1450a29-38). According to these arguments, 
then, plot has primacy over character.
The above excursus is introduced by the words: “Aristotle pursued 
a topic which seemed to interest him”. The comments about the 
primacy of plot are thus made in passing by the fictional Aristotle; 
they are not necessitated by the preceding passage. Moreover, they 
occur too early in Aristotle and poetic justice to have any effect on the 
dénouement of the plot. However, the discerning reader might recall 
this passage and read through it as through a palimpsest when, much 
later (391), the plot of Aristotle and poetic justice is likened to the plot 
of a tragedy. 
5.4 The length of a plot
After viewing the friezes of the Siphnian Treasury and the Treasury of the 
Athenians in the course of their tour of Delphi, Aristotle remarks:
[T]hese friezes are just right, as they are various and intricate yet 
of a size to be taken in with the eye – just as a good literary plot, 
while it cannot consist of a tiny episode, must be of a length which 
memory can retain. […] Polygnotos was a great painter. […] But 
no painter nowadays would create murals so crowded with various 
figures and actions. Meaning requires unity. If a story is full of mere 
episodes, then the story is mistakenly planned […] (212-13).
25 Poetics 6. 1450a15-25.
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This passage is based on a hypotext in the Poetics26 where the 
proper magnitude for other works of art is also applied to literature. 
The argument is that there are limitations to the human eye (in the 
case of the visual and plastic arts) and the human memory (in the case 
of literary genres). Just as the friezes must be of a size (mevgeqo~) to be 
perceived at a glance (eujsuvnopton), so a tragedy must have a length 
(mh`ko~) to be taken in by memory (eujmnhmovneuton). If these limita-
tions are exceeded, communication will fail. If the object seen or the 
text read is too small or too short, the same applies. This proviso has 
been succinctly formulated by Rorty (1992: 4):
Like all representation, drama selectively condenses and structures 
what it presents. It reveals the inner logic and causal organization 
of an apparently disconnected series of events, encompassing them 
to form a single extended, self-contained and completed activity.
Moreover, as Deborah Roberts (1992: 134) reminds us: “Where 
even epic is limited in what it can actually include, tragedy – both 
shorter and more compact – is more radically so.” This is reinforced 
by a remark earlier in chapter 727 about the completeness and whole-
ness of tragedy: “To be a whole is to have a beginning (ajrch;n) and a 
middle (mevson) and an end (teleuthvn)”.
But are Greek tragedies really so neatly packaged? It could be 
argued that part of what happens in Athenian, and especially Euripi-
dean, tragedy precedes the prologue and succeeds the exodos. The 
retrospective part of a typical Euripidean prologue and the prophetic 
component of the parting speech by a deus ex machina imply action 
outside the parameters of “beginning” and “end”. In that sense, be-
ginning and closure should not be used as absolute terms referring 
to the first and last lines of a tragedy, respectively.
The quotation from chapter 7 of the Poetics serves as hypotext 
for the dénouement scene in the novel. When Aristotle has assembled 
all the characters involved in Doody’s murder mystery, he is ready 
to explain his deductions and conclusions step by step, à la Hercule 
26 Poetics 7. 1451a3-6.
27 Poetics 7. 1450b26-27.
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Poirot. But before he starts, he remarks, seemingly stating the obvi-
ous: “Every story should have a beginning, a middle and an end, but 
where to start is often a puzzle” (343). For the purposes of his dénoue-
ment, he starts with the abduction of Anthia, although he realises 
that it was preceded by planning.
Aristotle’s remarks concerning the correct length of a plot in 
tragedy have thus been triggered off by the mathematical propor-
tions he observed in the architectural friezes at Delphi.
5.5 Historical personae?
Still in Delphi, Aristotle notices the votive marble Sphinx dedicated 
by the Naxians, and is reminded of the riddle of the Sphinx and thus 
of the Delphic maxim “Know Thyself” (218-19). These musings 
then set off the following train of thought:
[…] if a man doesn’t fully know himself, how can he fully know 
another? The poets pretend to know, but they fully know only 
men they themselves create. Tragedy, it is true, usually deals with 
historical persons, and often with what has manifestly happened. 
Yet different poets give different accounts of the same persons. 
Aiskhylos and Euripides created different Elektras, for instance. 
Who is the real Elektra? (219).
Does Greek tragedy, in fact, deal with historical persons? A de-
manding student might answer that there are only three tragedies to 
which this applies: Aeschylus’ Persians, produced in 472 BC, based on 
the events of the naval battle off Salamis in 480 and containing his-
torical personae such as Queen Atossa and King Xerxes, as well as the 
non-extant The capture of Miletos, produced in 492, and The Phoinissai, 
produced in 476, both by Phrynichos. Does the fictional Aristotle, 
then, err in his judgment? Let us examine his hypotext:28 “In regard 
to tragedy […], our poets cling to the names of the heroes of the past 
(tw`n genomevnwn ojnomavtwn) on the principle that whatever is capable 
of happening is readily believable.” The solution for a modern reader 
is to realise that for the Greeks, myth constituted history. This consid-
eration accounts for the fictional Aristotle’s choice of words: “historical 
28 Poetics 9. 1451b15-16.
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persons” and “what has manifestly happened”. Whereas the personae 
in Middle and New Comedy were usually invented by the playwright, 
Greek tragedy had a vast pool of mythical material, regarded as his-
torical, to draw on for both plot and characters.
Do different poets treat the same mythical material in different 
ways? The Aristotelian hypotext for this claim29 reads as follows: “A 
poet may not alter completely (luvein) the traditional stories; […] 
but he should be inventive (euJrivskein) in adapting the stories that 
have been handed down.” Euripides, for instance, made use of the 
available mythical material when composing his Medea, but innova-
tively added the Aigeus scene, thus introducing the theme of child-
lessness and providing a refuge for Medea in Athens.
As regards Aristotle’s claim concerning Elektra, we are, as it hap-
pens, in the exceptional position to evaluate it because Elektra trag-
edies by all three the major fifth-century tragic poets are extant: Ae-
schylos’ Choephoroi, Sophokles’ Elektra and Euripides’ Elektra. Indeed, 
these three versions portray the psychology and motivation of Elektra, 
her relationship with Orestes, and her role in the matricide differently. 
To compare but the first variable: the Aeschylean Elektra is motivated 
not so much by love of her father as by hatred of her mother and obedi-
ence to Apollo (De Marre 1988: 7); the Sophoklean Elektra by love of 
her father and a sense of duty, obedience to the oracle playing a lesser 
role (De Marre 1988: 11). In Euripides, the heroic is debunked and the 
full horror of the murders depicted, with Elektra showing hypocritical 
concern for her mother (De Marre 1988: 23, 38).
Aristotle’s claim about the historical basis of tragedy has thus 
been set in motion by a totally different subject – self-knowledge. 
This, in turn, was a natural consequence of his being reminded of 
the Delphic maxim gnw`qi seau`ton. It therefore becomes clear that 
Aristotle’s reflections on the Poetics are no mere obiter dicta, but are 
triggered by the specifics of the situation in which he finds himself 
as he attempts to solve the murder mystery.
29 Poetics 14. 1453b22-26.
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5.6 Reversal and recognition
Aristotle and Stephanos have come to Delphi to consult the Oracle 
of Apollo on the liberation of slaves (in particular, Korydon and Kal-
lirrhoe) and marriage, respectively. They are uncertain as to how to 
proceed and are seeking divine guidance. Against the background, 
then, of divine omniscience and the limitations of human know-
ledge, Aristotle remarks:
The unforgettable thing about Tragedy – and it is present even in 
Comedy – is Ignorance. Ignorance reminds us of our true condi-
tion. Discovery is most important in the plot of fiction. […] Dis-
covery moves us from ignorance to knowledge. […] All memora-
ble stories have in them the divine element of piercing recognition. 
And recognition usually accompanies a change, a reversal (220).30
Two famous definitions in the Poetics serve as the hypotext of this 
passage:
•	 Reversal	(peripevteia) is the change of fortune (metabolh;) in the 
action of the play to the opposite state of affairs […]; and this change 
[…] should be in accordance with probability and necessity.31
•	 Recognition	(ajnagnwvrisi~) […] is a change from ignorance (ejx 
ajgnoiva~) to knowledge (eij~ gnw`sin), bringing about a state of 
friendship or one of hostility on the part of those who have been 
marked out for good fortune or for bad.32
In the latter definition, the relationship between the key words is 
reinforced by their etymological kinship.
An example of ajnagnwvrisi~ is provided by the fortunes of Oedipus, 
who experiences a recognition or a discovery – a change from igno-
rance to knowledge – when first the Corinthian Messenger and then 
the Theban Shepherd provide new information pertaining to his ge-
nealogy. But since the ostensible good news brought by the Messenger 
30 For a comparable passage, cf p 260: “Indeed, although this has been a scene 
rich in peripeteia and recognition, our rich heiress is still lost. […] Who would 
believe that Anthia could be abducted for two days and still be marriageable? 
An impossible probable, or probable impossible.”
31 Poetics 11. 1452a22-24.
32 Poetics 11. 1452a29-32.
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proves to be bad news, Oedipus simultaneously experiences a change 
of fortune for the worse. Paradoxically, then, blissful ignorance has 
protected him from the pain of knowledge. The role of ignorance ver-
sus knowledge was not limited to tragedy; as Erich Segal (1969: 77) 
remarks, “  [Agnoia has often been called the patron goddess of New 
Comedy”. It is often ignorance of family relationships that creates 
dramatic suspense in New Comedy. When, at the end of a comedy, 
the impoverished suitor serendipitously discovers his relationship to a 
rich testator, he is ready to marry the girl of his choice. Sometimes this 
is facilitated by the discovery that she is also of noble birth.
Once again, a happenstance in the story line – a visit to the oracle 
– has given the fictional Aristotle occasion to reflect on the hypotext 
of his historical counterpart, thus providing the reader with literary 
food for thought in addition to the murder mystery.
5.7 Family ties
With reference to family relationships and the role of inheritance law in 
the planning of the murders,33 the fictional Aristotle remarks: “It was a 
family crime. As in so many dramas. Dreadful deeds seem more terrible 
and pitiful when they are committed by natural friends” (371).34
The hypotext for this remark is to be found in a passage35 where 
the historical Aristotle is discussing different ways of eliciting fear 
and pity when the characters in tragedy have different degrees of 
ignorance or knowledge of the tragic incidents. The pivotal sentence 
reads as follows: “Whenever the tragic incidents (ta; pavqh) occur in 
situations involving close ties of blood (ejn tai`~ filivai~), […] there 
will be something pitiable.” Once again, it should be borne in mind 
that fear and pity play an indispensable role in Aristotle’s definition 
33 Doody is clearly well acquainted with the intricacies of Athenian inheritance 
law, and the lure of inheritance money is the prime motive for the murders. 
However, this issue lies outside the scope of this article.
34 For a comparable passage, cf 390: “Families are important, […] as recent events 
have shown us. But not always happy, are they? Like Agamemnon’s ill-starred 
family.”
35 Poetics 14. 1453b19-22.
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of tragedy. Fear and pity can best be elicited when characters are 
emotionally and genetically close, and a tragic deed such as murder 
threatens to take place, with the would-be perpetrator achieving 
anagnorisis in time.36 One example adduced by the historical Aristo-
tle is that of Orestes’ sacrifice being averted in Iphigenia amongst the 
Taurians when Iphigenia recognises him in time. White (1992: 232) 
gives an apt summary of this theme:
The importance of personal ties (philia) is that the protagonists 
harm (or almost harm) people they themselves would much rather 
not harm. In the better plays, their own horror when they recognize 
the terrible things they have done, or the joy when they learn in 
time what they were about to do, dramatizes for us in the audience 
the moral importance of concerns for philoi. For when enemies do 
(or almost do) terrible things to one another, their actions typically 
cause them bitter satisfaction, not grief – witness the Hecuba.
In the passage from Aristotle and poetic justice, the fictional Aristotle’s 
thoughts on the importance of family ties in tragedy are not an abstract 
academic exercise devoid of context, but are triggered by the real-life 
parallel of the role of family ties in the planning of the murders.
5.8 Surprise
The passages discussed in 5.8 to 5.11 appear in the last chapter of the 
novel, called Aristotle’s Poetics, thus suggesting a more coherent focus 
on what is promised in the title of the novel.
After Stephanos has suggested that the events of the previous days 
would make a wonderful tragedy – or even an epic – (390), Aristotle 
comments, with reference to the young lovers Korydon and Kallirrhoe:
What epic or dramatic writer of worth would ever deal with the 
lives of two unimportant […] young people who pass through 
many illogical vicissitudes? Now, Lysippos’ and Timotheos’ story 
has logical unity, certainly. Cause and effect – though with a cer-
tain dash of chance, of the kind not uncommon in Tragedy (391).
In the discussion of a previous passage (5.2), the role of Aristotelian 
“probability” and “necessity” was emphasised. By the same token, ran-
domness was censured. This is commensurate with the “logical unity” 
36 Poetics 14. 1454a4-9.
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and “cause and effect” ascribed by the fictional Aristotle to Lysippos’ and 
Timotheos’ experiences. Now, however, the possibility of “a certain dash 
of chance” is added. Is this not inconsistent? Does it not fly in the face 
of logical coherence? There is a hypotext in the Poetics which may shed 
some light on it.37 After slating episodic plots, Aristotle argues that
fearful and pitiable incidents […] are intensified when they occur 
unexpectedly (para; th;n dovxan), yet because of one another (di’ 
a[llhla). For there is more of the marvellous (to; qaumasto;n) in 
them if they occur this way than if they occurred spontaneously 
and by chance (ajpo; tou` aujtomavtou kaiv th`~ tuvch~). Even in regard 
to coincidences (tw`n ajpo; tuvch~), those seem to be most aston-
ishing (qaumasiwvtata) that appear to have some design (w{sper 
ejpivthde~) associated with them.
Hardison’s commentary on this passage (Golden & Hardison 
1968: 163) makes it even clearer: 
An incident such as a murder is pitiable and fearful by itself; it is 
all the more so if it carries with it the shock of surprise. Finally, the 
shock will be greater if, after the incident has occurred, we realize 
that the plot was leading up to it all along.
When one compares the passages in Doody and in the Poetics, the 
historical Stageiran proves to be more circumspect in his qualifica-
tions than his fictional counterpart. Nevertheless, the Poetics passage 
quoted has clearly served as hypotext.
5.9 The tragic hero and plot
When asked by Aristotle about the central figure or hero of their 
adventure, Stephanos suggests, first, Straton, and then, Timotheos. 
Aristotle then sets out his criteria for deciding on a hero and a plot:
The passing of a thoroughly bad man from good to bad fortune satis-
fies the feelings of an audience. For no one who loves mankind and 
respects social law would wish it otherwise. So too with the reward of 
the good. We may call this ‘philanthropic justice’. But the discovery 
and rightful death of a bad man is not the stuff of true tragedy. It 
does not stir pity and fear. The protagonist of a tragedy ought to be a 
man somewhat like our own selves – or ourselves as we think we are 
–  but really better in some ways. A man who falls not through gross 
villainy but through making some fatal mistake (391).
37 Poetics 9. 1452a1-7.
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In this scheme, the fictional Aristotle suggests three types of plot: 
the passing of a thoroughly bad man from good to bad fortune (to be 
rejected); the passing of a thoroughly good man from bad to good 
fortune (to be rejected), and the passing of an above-average man from 
good to bad fortune through a fatal mistake (to be commended).
In the hypotext for this passage,38 the reasons for the rejection of 
the first and second types and for the endorsement of the third type 
are provided in more detail, with a further two possibilities: the 
passing of thoroughly bad men (tou;~ mocqhrou;~) from bad to good 
fortune (ejx ajtuciva~ eij~ eujtuxi;an), and the passing of thoroughly 
good men (tou;~ ejpieikei`~ a[ndra~) from good to bad fortune. The 
historical Aristotle also rejects both these last possibilities.
Much speculative energy has been invested in the nature of the 
“fatal mistake” (aJmartiva) leading to the tragic hero’s fall. Golden’s 
translation (“miscalculation”) gives an intellectual air to it which 
will be applicable to a fair number of tragic heroes, but is too one-
sided; Rorty (1992: 2) opts for the quaint term “an erring wayward-
ness”. Sherman (1992: 178) gives the following explanation of the 
protagonist’s position: “The tragic hero is not simply the victim of 
arbitrary fate or irrational accident. […] Rather what matters is that 
the agent chooses, but chooses in a way that leads to calamity. The 
choice goes awry because of ignorance or misjudgement […].”
What responsibility do tragic heroes have for their choices? Is 
actual culpability at stake, or mere negligence? White (1992: 230) 
provides the following alternatives:
Whether or not [the protagonists] act intentionally for bad ends 
that they choose at the start, their action must bring about (or at 
least threaten to bring about) unwanted results; whether or not their 
choice is a ‘moral error’, their action has a ‘moral cost’ only if it results 
in the loss (or imminent loss) of something they rightly value. This 
may be a cost they are willing to pay, as in Medea’s decision to sacri-
fice her children, or Electra’s support for matricide; or it may come 
as a complete surprise, as when Oedipus discovers his relationship to 
the man he killed and the family with whom he lives.
38 Poetics 13. 1452b30-1453a17.
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By the criteria of the implicit hypotext of the Poetics, the fictional 
Aristotle concludes, Timotheos does not pass muster as a tragic hero. 
Since he regards Timotheos as a thoroughly bad man, neither pity nor 
fear was elicited when he walked off the cliff at Delphi. Pity, according 
to the historical Aristotle, would have been experienced had his mis-
fortune been undeserved, and fear if the onlookers could identify with 
him. But now, the fictional Aristotle argues, “[the audience] would 
feel something more like satisfaction: ‘Ah! There he goes! Serves him 
right!’ That sort of thing isn’t found in good literature” (392).
Aristotle’s judgment is probably influenced by the fact that Tim-
otheos is depicted in the novel as a holier-than-thou Platonist who 
regards himself as a lover of the Beautiful and the Good (65). In sup-
port, Timotheos quotes from the Symposium (65-6):
The soul of the true lover, passing beyond particular things, climbs 
aloft to the highest beauty so that in the end he knows the being of 
Beauty itself, pure and unmixed, uncontaminated with the flesh and 
colouring of humanity and that sort of transient and dying stuff.39
Timotheos is dismissive of his non-philosophical brother Lysippos:
He has set his mind on particulars, material things, mere shadows 
and shows of the real. If he had learned, as Plato says, to love the 
Good, he would know that what happens – or seems to happen – in 
this shadowy cave40 is not of importance. He sets his heart on that 
which passes away, on mortal flesh subject to decay (279).
Timotheos’ Platonic otherworldliness is dangerous: he thinks that 
his Platonism elevates him above ordinary mortals (328), and it is 
this hubris that leads to the callous murders he commits. In fact, in 
another passage (329) he exclaims: “I am a midwife of the spirit, true 
descendant of Sokrates and Plato. Yet I was despised.” Clearly, he had 
a chip on his shoulder: he even wanted to found another Academy, 
with himself as head (372).
39 The intertext for this quotation is Symposium 211d-e.
40 The metaphor of the cave is described in Republic 514a-518b. For a comparable 
passage, cf p 308, where a despondent Gorgias disparages Aristotle’s sugges-
tion to pray to Apollo: “Phantom and illusion. The shadows of the imitation 
of things, flickering on cave walls.”
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Aristotle’s judgment of the character of Timotheos as mocqhrov~ 
is thus exacerbated by the discrepancy between Timotheos’ avowed 
idealism and his hidden opportunism and greed. If someone lacking 
the lofty ideals of Timotheos had been guilty of a double murder, it 
would already have been morally reprehensible; the huge gap between 
Timotheos’ theory and practice makes it all the more repugnant.
A question that cannot be avoided is whether Aristotle shows pre-
judice against Timotheos as a member of a rival philosophical school. 
Although there was no love lost between the Academy and the Ly ceum, 
and although Timotheos is depicted almost as a caricature of a pie-in-
the-sky philosophy Aristotle as realist would have rejected, there is no 
suggestion of prejudice in the text: throughout, Aristotle remains the 
detached observer who weighs his evidence with impartiality and ar-
rives at his conclusions with an almost Olym pian aloofness. But he does 
so without dispensing with his humanity: above all, he remains true to 
his humanist principles, as is borne out when he advises Lysippos to flee 
to Naxos in order to avoid the Athenian charge of bouleusis (336), or when 
he arranges for Korydon and Kallirrhoe to be set free (374), or when he 
goes out of his way to help procure a wife for Stephanos.
5.10 The double plot
After Aristotle has discarded Lysippos as protagonist, Stephanos 
asks: “But what about the Odyssey? There you have different endings 
for good and bad characters. And nobody could call the Odyssey a 
shabby work!” Aristotle replies:
[…] the Odyssey is a tale of wonders. It is not a tragedy, and you 
see at once how difficult it would be to make a play of it. The sort 
of ending you describe, where the good are rewarded and the bad 
punished, belongs more properly to comedy, which is not intended 
to arouse pity and fear (392). 
The hypotext for this passage41 reads as follows:
The second ranking plot (suvstasi~) […] has a double structure 
of events, as in the Odyssey, ending in opposite ways (ejx ejnantiva~) 
for the better and worse characters. […] But this double structure 
41 Poetics 13. 1453a30-38.
52
Acta Academica 2010 42(1)
of events involves a pleasure (hJdonh;) that is not an appropriate 
(oijkeiva) pleasure of tragedy but rather of comedy. For in comedy, 
whoever are the greatest enemies in the story – for example, Orestes 
and Aegisthus – become friends at the end, go off together, and no 
one is killed by anyone.
The double plot is comparable to a modern subplot in that at-
tention is diverted from a single main plot, for which Aristotle has 
a definite preference in tragedy. Earlier in chapter 13 he criticised 
the reward of a “good” hero and the punishment of a “bad” hero as 
belonging to a plot that will not elicit pity and fear;42 now he gives 
an example from epic: the reward of Odysseus, who is reunited with 
Penelope, and the punishment of the suitors, who are killed. In a 
genre such as epic this may be allowed; in tragedy, it violates dra-
matic economy. Moreover, the “pleasure” of such a double plot is not 
really tragic, but comic. The pleasure appropriate to tragedy is fear 
and pity; that of (Middle and New) comedy, according to Hardison 
(Golden & Hardison 1968: 188) is the reconciliation of enemies and 
the sudden triumph of love over hate. Comic catharsis, Hardison 
speculates, could involve such a mechanism.
The fictional Aristotle thus used the background provided by the 
vicissitudes of the “bad” hero Timotheos to theorise about two further 
genres: epic and comedy. However, his conclusion is that “[…] once 
murder comes in at the door, Comedy flies out of the window” (393).
5.11 Fiction
Having discarded tragedy and comedy, but still speculating on the 
question whether their experiences could be expressed in terms of a 
literary genre, Aristotle remarks:
There is, however, […] an art for which we have no name yet – a 
lower art than the pure poetic. This can be seen in Sophron’s comic 
sketches and Plato’s dialogues, where characters talk of whatever oc-
curs to them in ordinary language (more or less) without metre […]. 
If this art were to develop itself further, as we know Epic and Tragedy 
have developed, then we might have a new form which could accom-
modate you. […] Literature is in the process of becoming. […] For 
purging of fear and pity may not be all we want or need (393-394).
42 Cf 5.9 above.
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The hypotext for the fictional Aristotle’s remark is to be found in 
the first chapter of the Poetics:43
The art that imitates by words alone (toi`~ lovgoi~ yiloi`~), in prose 
and in verse […], has been nameless (ajnwvnumoi) up to the present 
time. For we cannot assign a common name to the mimes (mivmou~) of 
Sophron and Xenarchos and the Socratic dialogues (lovgou~) […].
Poetry was held in higher regard by the ancient Greeks than prose. 
Indeed, when Plato44 and Aristotle45 classify different genres in terms 
of the manner of imitation, they restrict themselves to the three main 
poetic genres, discarding existent prose genres such as historiography, 
rhetoric and philosophical dialogue, the first two being perceived as 
non-mimetic, and thus non-fictional, in any case. For that reason, too, 
the discussion of the fictional Aristotle and Stephanos has until now 
focused on the poetic genres of tragedy and comedy. But since the 
nominated “hero”, Timotheos, does not meet the requirements of a 
tragic hero, and murder is not commensurate with comedy, Aristotle 
has to explore other generic avenues, dispensing with poetry.
According to Lucas (1972: 60), the mimes of Sophron of Syracuse 
(late fifth century) and his son Xenarchos are brief realistic sketches 
from everyday life, probably in rhythmic prose, developed, perhaps, 
from the comedies of Epicharmos. Plato’s dialogues, of course, are 
longer philosophical prose discourses with a (semi-)fictionalised Soc-
rates as main interlocutor. What do these two genres have in common? 
Hardison believes that currently these would probably be called sim-
ply “fiction” (Golden & Hardison 1968: 70). In that sense they would 
differ from historiography or rhetoric, for instance. At any rate, it 
should be clear that, in dispensing with poetry, the fictional Aristotle 
has a narrower focus than his historical counterpart. This is probably 
to sidestep the historical Aristotle’s hazy terminology and to accom-
modate Doody’s preference for narrative prose fiction. 
At the end of the novel we find Aristotle evaluating his adventure 
and its participants in literary terms. Their yardstick is Aristotle’s 
43 Poetics 1. 1447a28-b11.
44 Republic 392d.
45 Cf 5.1 above.
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Poetics. Ultimately, Stephanos has to concede that the “drama” they 
have experienced – if it is a tragedy at all – is not “the best kind of 
tragedy”, since the protagonist, if it is Timotheos, does not meet Ar-
istotle’s criteria, and they have not experienced fear and pity. Nor is 
it comedy, for murder is not commensurate with this genre. Perhaps, 
however, it is a yet unnamed genre. In this instance Doody, with 
Aristotle as her mouthpiece, probably anticipates the Hellenistic 
novel. Had they known the term, they would therefore have called it 
a novel or, more specifically and proleptically, a detective novel with 
romantic and philosophical overtones.
6. Evaluation
In conclusion, Doody’s use of hypertext should be evaluated, with the 
modified version of Genette’s scheme in Section 4 as criterion. The many 
examples of intertextual adaptation or allusion in Doody’s novel (for 
example, Hesiod, Euripides’ Ion, Menander) lie outside the scope of this 
article. Moreover, I have stated my reasons for treating the Poetics as trans-
generic hypo- and hypertext rather than intertext: it represents a genre dif-
ferent from the (Hellenistic or modern) novel and allusions to it appear 
with sufficient frequency to justify the categorisation of hypotext.
How does Doody make use of her Aristotelian hypotext? To what 
extent are Aristotle’s musings on a literary-theoretical subject inte-
grated into the murder mystery plot? An analysis of the eleven exam-
ples I have identified in Section 6 gives the following results.
There is only one case of obiter dicta, where the fictional Aristotle’s 
comments on action in drama are made out of the blue (5.3). Most of 
his thoughts on drama (six out of the eleven examples) are triggered 
by associations with his immediate environment. For instance, he 
starts talking about narrative style and “the fearful” as a natural re-
sult of hearing Dametas’ ghost stories (5.1 & 5.2); his comments on 
the length of a plot arise from exposure to the proportions of Delphic 
friezes (5.4); his thoughts on anagnorisis are triggered by his igno-
rance when he goes to consult the oracle (5.6). A third category is to 
be found towards the end of the novel (6.8-5.11), where the solution 
to the murders leads to an independent literary discussion between 
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Aristotle and Stephanos which appears to form more of a logically 
coherent argument, fulfilling the catchy title. In the process, Doody, 
with Aristotle as her mouthpiece, attempts to apply the require-
ments of different literary genres to different heroes (or villains), as 
if they were characters in fiction rather than in real life.
It could be asked why Doody has included forays into poetics in 
what purports to be a detective novel. The answer is twofold. First, 
Doody’s academic research has focused on the history and generic 
specifics of the novel,46 albeit her field of specialisation is the eight-
eenth century. Secondly, she has admitted in an interview that she 
would be just as happy to be called a “historical novelist” as a “detec-
tive story writer” or a “mystery writer”.47 Thus, the detective plot 
could be regarded as a useful backdrop against which she displays 
her knowledge of not only, for instance, Athenian inheritance law or 
late fourth-century history, but also the Poetics.
The genre of Doody’s work clearly warrants the use of faction hy-
pertextuality. Although her genre necessitates that not only the plot 
but also all the characters, including the seemingly historical, are fic-
tional, her novel is solidly grounded in 330 BC, and biographical ref-
erences to Alexander, Aristotle and Theophrastos, for instance, are in 
accord with the known historical facts gleaned from the works of the 
latter two authors and from historiographers. In fact, in a novel not 
without its defects, attention to historical detail is Doody’s forte.
The application of Genette’s term palimpsest to Doody’s novel 
implies that even a classicist who is thoroughly acquainted with 
Aristotle’s Poetics will not be able to re-read the latter work without 
recalling her flesh-and-blood philosopher-turned-detective. Linda 
Hutcheon (2006: 121) describes this process as follows:
If we know the [adapted] work(s) in question, we become a know-
ing audience [or knowing readers, FP], and part of what hermeneutic 
theory calls our ‘horizon of expectation’ involves that adapted text. 
What is intriguing is that, afterward, we often come to see the 
prior adapted work very differently as we compare it to the result 
of the adapter’s creative and interpretative act.
46 Cf <http://www nd.ed/~mdoody/>
47 Cf <http://www nd.ed/~mdoody/>
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Doody’s novel thus becomes a palimpsest through which the cer-
ebrally dry document is read as not merely a set of rules wrested from 
the Stageiran’s cognitive machinery in his study, but a set of attitudes 
which he could innovatively apply to everyday situations. The term 
to; qaumastovn, for instance, will be concretised in the example of 
Dametas’ ghost stories; the character defects of a mocqhrov~ will be 
embodied in the fake Platonist Timotheos; tragic ajnagnwvrisi~ will 
be associated with Aristotle’s a-gnostic visit to the Delphic oracle. 
Aristotle’s Poetics will remain lurking in the subconscious of 
a reader who embarks on other Aristotelian murder mysteries by 
Doody, even in the absence of a tragic hypotext. Moreover, Doody’s 
Aristotle will keep hovering in the background when one re-reads 
the Politics or the Metaphysics or the Nicomachean Ethics. Thus, any 
further “innocent” reading of either Aristotle or Doody has been ir-
revocably undermined by exposure to this palimpsest.
7. Conclusion
Popular novels and films have done much for the popularisation of 
the classics. Some moviegoers may have gone to see Troy for the sake 
of Brad Pitt or Diane Kruger, but went home with a newly discovered 
interest in antiquity. The latter consideration, I believe, outweighs 
the flaws of the film. The same argument could probably be applied 
to films such as 300, Alexander and Gladiator. In an article criticising 
the many historical inaccuracies in Gladiator, Allen Ward neverthe-
less is positive about the role it plays in popularising the classics:
One of the best things about this movie is that it is part of a long 
line of books, plays, films, and works of art that keep alive interest 
in the Ancient World among the general public, something at 
which artists and writers have been far more successful over the 
centuries than professional historians.48
Writing about adaptations in general, Linda Hutcheon (2006: 176) 
also strikes a positive note:
An adaptation is not vampiric: it does not draw the life-blood from 
its source and leave it dying or dead, nor is it paler than the adapted 
work. It may, on the contrary, keep that prior work alive, giving it 
an afterlife it would never have had otherwise.
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Readers would, I think, rather become involved with the mis-
adventures of Gordianus the Finder than struggle through Cicero’s 
courtroom speeches.49 By the same logic, many non-classicists read-
ing Doody’s novel for the sake of a whodunnit will unwittingly 
become acquainted with the world of Aristotle and thus, perhaps, 
become converts to the classics. Such a Trojan Horse technique is 
perfectly justifiable in an age when cultural literacy is dwindling and 
the same readers are very unlikely to read a translation of the Poetics 
or an academic book about Aristotle.
Not every murder mystery author is a P D James. Some aficionados 
might complain that Doody has made a meal of the plot by compli-
cating it with too many digressions. If that is the case, at least she 
has also provided a dessert delectable to the gourmet and, perhaps, 
even delicious to the gourmand by giving Aristotle a makeover. 
When one reads Aristotle again, it will be through the palimpsest of 
Doody’s astute and likeable PI.
48 <http://ablemedia.com/ctcweb/showcase/wardgladiator4.html>
49 Popular films and novels such as those mentioned in this instance have recently 
spawned books and collections of articles in reception studies (cf Pomeroy 2009, 
Hilton 2005, Bitarello 2009, Goldhill 2009 & Easton 2009).
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